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 The If, How, and When of Criminal 




Most lawyers and laymen alike would probably claim to have at least some idea as to 
the meaning of the concept of jurisdiction. They might say that it indicates some form of 
competence or authority of a legal institution or even a state. However, as aptly stated by 
Malanczuk:1
‘Jurisdiction is a word which must be used with extreme caution. It sounds impressively 
technical, and yet many people think that they have a vague idea of what it means; there 
is therefore a temptation to use the word without stopping to ask what it means.’
In some cases, jurisdiction may refer to a certain territory on which judicial or political 
entities can exercise their authority, or it may simply refer to such an entity in itself. Thus, 
one might say that a suspect fled the jurisdiction of Finland or Sweden, but one could 
also refer to Finland or Sweden as jurisdictions themselves.2 Under human rights treaties, 
states may also have an obligation towards individuals who are within their jurisdiction, 
which primarily entails a requirement of effective control.3  
* LL.D., University Lecturer in Criminal and Procedural Law, University of Helsinki.
1  Malanczuk, Akehurst’s modern introduction to international law (Routledge 1997) p. 109.
2 See Liivoja, The criminal jurisdiction of states – A theoretical primer, 7 No Foundations: Journal 
of Extreme Legal Positivism (2010) pp. 25–58, at 26.
3 According to art. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights: ‘The High Contracting 
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of this Convention.’ See e.g. Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford University Press 2009) pp. 804–807.
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Nevertheless, jurisdiction usually refers to the exercise of state power or authority in 
some form.4 In general terms, jurisdiction designates the power of a sovereign to affect 
the rights of persons.5 This may be done in a variety of ways, and a state’s criminal juris-
diction is only one aspect of the totality of a state’s sovereign powers. The fact that a state 
has — or claims to have — criminal jurisdiction, then implies that the state has the power 
to affect the rights of persons by means of criminal law, which can be indicated by the 
state having penal authority or a power to punish.
As we are dealing with a pronounced legal technical concept, its meaning will not only 
depend upon the legal context generally, but also which legal system we are examin-
ing. For instance, in Finnish legal doctrine, the equivalent to the concept of jurisdiction 
would be toimivalta, which can be translated as ‘power to act’. As regards criminal juris-
diction, the German concept of Strafgewalt is also quite apt, as it could be translated as 
‘penal power’ or ‘authority’. In a sense, these terms are more telling than the English term 
jurisdiction or the Swedish term jurisdiktion, since they already semantically imply some 
form of power or authority. 
In this article, I will give a concise overview of my understanding of the legal phenom-
enon of criminal jurisdiction.6 This will be done by examining the concept of criminal 
jurisdiction on different levels and by posing different questions. In doing so, I have at-
tempted to integrate Nordic, German as well as international legal doctrines into the ex-
amination. The analysis is done with the full understanding that criminal jurisdiction can 
be perceived, analysed and defined in different ways. Accordingly, this examination only 
constitutes one way of looking at the matter. Neither does the article constitute an exhaus-
tive examination of criminal jurisdiction, but rather an assortment of selected aspects I 
find essential for understanding criminal jurisdiction as a legal phenomenon. Some of 
the questions I have omitted are: the dogmatic character of the national provisions on 
criminal jurisdiction, criminal policy reasons for exercising criminal jurisdiction and the 
legal justification for certain principles of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the article seeks to 
answer the question: What is criminal jurisdiction anyway?
4 See e.g. Oxman, Jurisdiction of States in Encyclopedia of Public International Law 10 (Elsevier 
Science Publishers B.V. 1987) p. 277, and Capps, Evans, Konstadinidis, Introduction in Asserting 
Jurisdiction, eds. Capps, Evans, Konstadinidis (Hart Publishing 2003) pp. xix–xx.
5 Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, Harvard Law Review (1923) pp. 241–262, at 241.
6 The examination is essentially an overview of some of the findings in Helenius, Straffrättslig 
jurisdiktion (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys 2014). 
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2.  Outlining the structure of criminal jurisdiction and raising the 
relevant questions
As already indicated, criminal jurisdiction presupposes a special type of state power, 
namely the power to punish. In order for a state to claim such a normative power, the 
claim must also be regarded as authoritative. This can be expressed as the state having 
penal authority. The existence of such an authority depends on several conditions. 
As a point of departure, it is important to note that criminal jurisdiction always has a 
national as well as an international dimension. On the national level, jurisdiction is com-
monly defined as the lawful competence of the state to influence the legal position of per-
sons through the exercise of powers in different forms.7 Here, jurisdiction concerns the 
relationship between the state and individuals, i.e. how the state exercises its jurisdiction 
vis-à-vis individual persons. Lawful in this sense entails what the state is authorised to do 
according to its national legislation. As the principle of legality requires that all criminal 
offences are established through law (nullum crimen sine lege), a state cannot prima facie 
claim a power to punish without this power being found in its national legislation.
On the international level, jurisdiction rather concerns the relationship between states, 
i.e. how states exercise — or are entitled to exercise — their jurisdiction vis-à-vis other 
states.8 When a state establishes its criminal jurisdiction over a certain act, it is simultane-
ously stating that it has the right vis-à-vis all other states to penalise and punish this act.9 
Since this statement involves rights and obligations between sovereign states, the foun-
dations for the criminal jurisdiction of a state necessarily must be found in international 
law. As soon as an offence displays connections to more than one state, jurisdictional 
problems arise that would not otherwise have arisen on the national level, or that at least 
cannot and should not be solved without referring to international law.10
Accordingly, if we accept that jurisdiction is a question that in some way falls within a 
normative framework regulated by international law, every national claim to jurisdiction 
must accord with standards of international law.11 In other words, on the international 
level, penal authority then entails a subjective right to punish (ius puniendi) in the sense 
7 See Oxman 1987 op. cit. p. 277 and Currie, International & Transnational Criminal Law (Irwin 
Law 2010) p. 50.
8 See Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 50.
9 See Capps, Evans, Konstadinidis 2003 op. cit. p. xxii. 
10 Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 50.
11 Capps, Evans, Konstadinidis 2003 op. cit. p. xxii.
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that a state is entitled to declare a certain behaviour prohibited and punishable.12 When a 
state exercises this subjective right, it therefore makes use of its right to punish.
Penal authority, in this sense, signifies a legal possibility and demarcates what the state 
normatively may do, i.e. a normative permission. Consequently, a state’s actual claim to 
its right to punish cannot directly be inferred from the mere existence of penal authori-
ty.13 A state’s right to punish in the sense of it having penal authority exists on the inter-
national level regardless of the extent to which the state actually makes use of this right. 
This also implies that a state can have a lawful power to punish according to its national 
law, but lack penal authority according to international law.14 However, within these nor-
mative boundaries set by international law, it is up to every state to decide to which extent 
and based on which criminal policy considerations it wishes to make use of its penal 
authority.15   
When the state lays claim to criminal jurisdiction, it thus makes use of the penal au-
thority it is entitled to – it exercises its right to punish. In the same way as it is essential 
to examine the state’s criminal law on different levels, it can also be fruitful to analyse 
the state’s criminal jurisdiction on different levels.16 Depending on which level we are 
examining, criminal jurisdiction may take different forms, require different standards of 
justification and balancing of interests and be exercised for different reasons.17
These levels are often examined by dividing the exercise of jurisdiction into three differ-
ent types, roughly corresponding to the tripartite division of the state’s sovereign power 
12 Jeβberger, Der transnationale Geltungsbereich des deutschen Strafrechts (Mohr Siebeck 2011) pp. 
8–9. In relation to individuals, the state’s ius puniendi also depends on the state’s claim being 
in conformity with fundamental principles of criminal law, such as the principle of legality and 
the principle of guilt, see further Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. pp. 140–164. One can also examine the 
state’s right to extraterritorial punishment from a moral philosophical perspective, see further 
Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment (OUP 2010), especially 
pp. 140–172.  
13 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit.,  p. 8.
14 Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 51.
15 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 9.
16 See Träskman, Provisions on Jurisdiction in Criminal Law – The Reform of Law Caught in the 
Tension between Tradition and Dynamism in Criminal Law Theory in Transition, eds. Lahti 
and Nuotio (Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company 1992) pp. 512–514 and cf. Jareborg, The 
Coherence of the Penal System in Essays in Criminal Law (Iustus förlag 1988) pp. 105–121, 
who divides the analysis of the penal system into the levels of criminalization, sentencing and 
execution.
17 See Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 3d (American Law Institute Publishers 1987) p. 231.
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into legislature, judiciary and executive. This division provides us with three different 
forms of jurisdictional exercise: jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate and to execute.18 
Prescriptive jurisdiction is exercised by the legislature when creating norms, which en-
compasses determining the substance of the norms as well as their scope. By enacting 
legislation on its (national) right to punish, the state establishes its claim to penal author-
ity through the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. The fact that a national legal system 
contains norms that forbid or require certain behaviour from individuals when outside 
its national territory, and penalise such behaviour, then implies that the state has jurisdic-
tion over the behaviour in question.
Judicial jurisdiction concerns the activities of judicial bodies when deciding their respec-
tive competences and when applying and interpreting norms created by the legislature. 
By exercising judicial jurisdiction, the state in practice enforces its claim to penal author-
ity as established on the legislative level. The fact that a national court may adjudicate on 
an offence committed abroad then implies that the court has jurisdiction over the offence.
Executive jurisdiction in its turn concerns the activities of authorities when exercising 
their powers to enforce and ensure observance of the law, e.g. through the use of coercive 
measures.19 Contrasting these aspects by the character of law they touch upon, the first 
component addresses an issue of substantive criminal law while the second and third 
components address issues of procedural law.20 On the legislative level, the state establish-
es its claim to penal authority through prescriptive jurisdiction. On the judicial level, the 
state enforces this claim through judicial jurisdiction.21
When analysing these levels, it can furthermore be useful to reshape the analysis into 
questions. By posing questions, the characteristics of the different levels may also reveal 
themselves. The main question in this case would probably be ‘why’: Why does the state 
legislate on criminal jurisdiction in a certain way? Why does the state adjudicate cer-
18 See e.g. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 3d op. cit. p. 231, Council of Europe, European 
Committee on Crime Problems, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, Criminal Law Forum nr. 3 
(1992) pp. 441−480, at 444–445 and Böse, Meyer, Schneider, Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal 
Matters in the European Union, Volume II: Rights, Principles and Model Rules (Nomos 2014) pp. 
22–23. 
19 Due to its different character as compared to prescriptive and judicial jurisdiction, I will largely 
disregard the question of executive jurisdiction in this article. For instance, it is largely agreed 
upon that states may not undertake any executive measures on the territory of other states 
without explicit permission. See on this matter e.g. Currie 2010 op. cit. pp. 92 ff.
20 Böse, Meyer, Schneider 2014 op. cit. pp. 23–24. 
21 Through the exercise of judicial and executive powers, the state can also be said to be ’enforcing’ 
norms prescribed by the legislature. Thus, judicial and executive jurisdiction can also be 
categorized as ’enforcement jurisdiction’, see Currie 2010 op. cit. pp. 53–54 and Böse, Meyer, 
Schneider 2014 op. cit. p. 23.  
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tain offences when committed abroad? Why does the state e.g. enforce sentences handed 
down abroad?22  
The question of ‘why’ is without doubt of utmost importance with regards to matters of 
criminal jurisdiction. In many ways, it is not very different from the question of ‘why’ 
we use criminal law at all: Why should we punish? Why should we criminalise certain 
behaviour? As regards criminal jurisdiction as an aspect of criminal law, additional ques-
tions arise due to the involvement of foreign elements: Why should we claim a right to 
punish acts committed abroad? As with criminal law generally, the question of ‘why’ as 
regards criminal jurisdiction encompasses a varied range not only of legal questions, but 
also of moral philosophical, and criminal policy questions. 
In this article, I have largely opted to disregard the question of ‘why’ and to examine the 
concept of criminal jurisdiction through a slightly different set of questions, mainly fo-
cusing on matters of a more legal dogmatic character. The questions I have opted for are: 
• Does the state have penal authority? 
• How should the state exercise its penal authority?
• When should the state enforce its penal authority? 
These questions may also be expressed as the ‘if ’, ‘how and ‘when’ of criminal jurisdiction.
 
3.  The ‘if ’ of criminal jurisdiction – Does the state have penal au-
thority?
3.1 The national level
Through the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, the state defines which acts it finds 
unwanted and therefore penalised. In this way the national legislator indicates the acts 
over which the state lays claim to criminal appraisal, i.e. the scope of behaviour it seeks to 
regulate through its penal system.23 The state’s claim on criminal appraisal is essentially 
manifested through the legislator’s criminalisation of unwanted behaviour. This scope 
of appraisal consists of all acts over which the state lays claim to penal authority. In this 
way, the state confirms to which extent it makes use of the penal authority it is entitled 
22 See in this sense Träskman 1992 op. cit. pp. 512–514.




to within the limits set by international law.24 The question of how far a state may extend 
its penal authority – i.e. the state’s subjective right to punish – therefore differs from the 
question of to which extent a state actually lays claim to penal authority.25 
Criminalisation in this sense, however, only implies the creation of abstract prohibitive 
norms, i.e. X constitutes an unwanted behaviour for which a penal threat is imposed. 
These abstract prohibitive norms do not automatically form a basis for national penal 
authority: e.g., can person A be punished for the act X if it is committed abroad? The 
abstract prohibitive norms, usually, tell us nothing about their applicability, as to where, 
by whom and against whom they are committed. 
However, a state can clearly not set about punishing someone for breaching a legislation 
that lacks a defined ambit of application26 and individual prohibitive norms cannot be 
left ‘empty’ with regards to their scope of application27. Thus, if we accept that individual 
prohibitive norms tell us nothing about their concrete applicability, this question has to 
be settled through further regulation. 
In most legal systems, the concrete applicability of individual prohibitive norms is only 
established through provisions on the scope of applicability of the national criminal law, 
i.e. what is commonly referred to as the provisions on criminal jurisdiction.28 Conse-
quently, the applicability of individual prohibitive norms has to be examined in connec-
tion to the question of national criminal law’s scope of application as a whole. By enacting 
rules on criminal jurisdiction, the state also determines the frames in which the abstract 
prohibitive norms can be applied in concreto. 
When establishing the scope of application of its criminal law, the national legislator 
exercises criminal jurisdiction in the form of prescriptive jurisdiction. Consequently, the 
question of whether or not the state has penal authority at the national level has to be 
24 See Jescheck & Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts – Allgemeiner Teil (Duncker & Humblot 1996) 
p. 163.
25 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. pp. 13–14.
26 Hirst, Jurisdiction and the Ambit of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press) 2003 p. 347.
27 Henrich, Das passive Personalitätsprinzip im deutschen Strafrecht (Max-Planck-Institut für 
ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, 1994) p. 10.
28 Träskman 1992 op. cit. p. 511 and Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. pp. 114. It should be noted that some 
legal systems, such as the English system, do not have any ‘general’ provisions on criminal 
jurisdiction. Rather, national criminal law applies only within the state’s territory in the absence 
of any specific statutory provision to the contrary. Prohibitory norms only apply extraterritorially 
if specific legislation creates extraterritorial liability, see Hirst 2003 op. cit. pp. 3–9. 
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answered with reference to the state’s national provisions on criminal jurisdiction. These 
provisions denote the extent to which the state lays claim to penal authority.29
In this sense, criminal jurisdiction only concerns the extent to which the national legis-
lator claims the right to criminal appraisal of certain behaviour, without anything being 
said about the state’s concrete claim to punishment through its national judiciary. Thus, 
in addition to the national legislator’s claim on the state’s right to criminal appraisal, the 
concept of jurisdiction may also refer to the national judiciary’s competence to apply 
criminal norms as stipulated by the national legislator.30
Naturally, a state’s authority to appraise certain behaviour through criminal law cannot 
exist alone; if penal threats are not to have more than a mere symbolic function, it must 
also be possible to implement them in practice. In other words, the state must also be able 
to enforce its claim on penal authority through the national judiciary’s exercise of judicial 
authority. Norms prescribed on the legislative level also have to be implemented on the 
judicial level.31
Accordingly, the state’s penal authority constitutes the basis for its judicial authority. If 
the state lacks penal authority, it also lacks the competence to initiate criminal proceed-
ings since its legal system does not come into question in the first place.32 It would ob-
viously be unfeasible for a state to enforce rules unless it has the authority to prescribe 
those rules.33
In order for judicial authority to exist, a concrete punishable act has to fall within the 
ambit of the state’s claim on penal authority. As a main rule, the state establishes its penal 
authority by enacting legislation on the scope of application of its criminal law. This is 
due to the presumption that national courts only apply national criminal law. Conse-
quently, as long as the national claim on penal authority is congruent with the scope of 
application of national criminal law, and as long as national courts only apply national 
criminal law, the provisions on the scope of application of national criminal law are also 
decisive for the jurisdiction of the state judiciary. The provisions on criminal jurisdiction, 
consequently, have a sort of dual nature: If a conduct falls within the scope of application 
of national criminal law, the door is also open for the national judiciary’s jurisdiction.34
29 However, the scope of application of the state’s criminal law is in principle distinct form the 
state’s claim on penal authority. In theory, the state may also claim a right to punish by reference 
to other than national criminal legislation, see further chapter 4.
30 See e.g. Vander Beeken et al., Finding the Best Place for Prosecution – European Study on 
Jurisdiction Criteria (Maklu, 2002) pp. 8–9.
31 Council of Europe 1992 op. cit. p. 456.
32 Jescheck & Weigend 1996 op. cit. p. 163.
33 Oxman 1987 op. cit. pp. 277–278.
34 See e.g. Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht (Verlag C.H. Beck 2008) p. 3.
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In this sense, judicial authority has to be understood as an abstract form of state authority 
to institute legal proceedings. The rules on which national court is actually competent 
in the concrete case are often found in national procedural legislation, and these rules 
should therefore not be confused with rules on the state’s penal authority.35 Accordingly, 
the state’s jurisdiction to adjudicate has a transnational as well as a national element. In 
order to answer the question of judicial competence, the following questions have to be 
answered:36 1. Does the state have penal authority? 2. Which national court is competent?
As a starting point, it is obviously in the interest of the state to subject all offences com-
mitted on its national territory to its penal authority. In a way, the whole penal system 
is constructed in consideration of the state territory.37 Within the state’s own territory, 
national penal authority in a sense exists per definition.38 This principle of territoriality is 
directly derived from the international principle of territorial sovereignty.39
However, the principle of territoriality does not entail exclusive territorial penal author-
ity, and thus a prohibition for states to claim penal authority over other acts than those 
committed on its own territory.40 States almost invariably also claim the right to extend 
their penal authority to acts committed abroad. In those cases, the state’s claim will inevi-
tably affect the interests of other states and give rise to international questions that cannot 
be decided by reference to the state’s national legal system alone. 
On the judicial level, one can without doubt claim that the concrete enforcement of 
norms pertaining to acts committed abroad always has a more substantial impact as re-
gards the relationship between states as well as between states and individuals.41 Conse-
quently, the state’s exercise of judicial authority over extraterritorial acts always requires 
further consideration and balancing of interests.42 Thus, even though the state’s penal 
and judicial authority are in principle congruent, it is essential that these elements are 
analysed separately. 
35 Hurtado Pozo, Droit pénal – Partie générale (Schulthess 2008) p. 63.
36 Cf. Stéfani, Levasseur, Bouloc, Procédure pénale (Dalloz) p. 489, who distinguish between ’la 
compétence internationale des juridictions répressives françaises’ and ’la compétence nationale 
des juridictions répressives françaises’. (”Ce sont les règles de compétence internationale qui 
répondent à la première question. Les règles de competence interne répondent à la seconde.”) 
37 Frände, Allmän straffrätt (Forum iuris 2012) p. 309 footnote 17.
38 Ziegenhain, Extraterritoriale Rechtsanwendung und die Bedeutung des Genuine-Link-
Erfordernisses – eine Darstellung der deutschen und amerikanischen Staatenpraxis (Beck 1992) p. 
12.
39 See e.g. Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 228.
40 Jescheck – Weigend 1996 op. cit. p. 168.
41 Tupamäki, Valtion rikosoikeudellisen toimivallan ulottuvuus kansainvälisessä oikeudessa (Finnish 
Branch of the International Law Association 1999) p. 22.
42 See further under part 5.
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3.2 The international level
It is often stated that characterizing the state’s provisions on criminal jurisdiction as 
‘international criminal law’ is misleading,43 since these norms are not part of any interna-
tional legal order but rather of every state’s national legal order.44 The norms on criminal 
jurisdiction only differ from other norms of criminal law in that they regulate situations 
with transnational or international elements, i.e. situations where other states’ or the 
international community’s interests come into play.45 Thus, the object of the norms on 
criminal jurisdiction can be regarded as international or transnational, while the norms 
themselves remain national.46  
However, the state’s criminal jurisdiction is, nonetheless, co-determined by standards 
of international law.47 Since the exercise of criminal jurisdiction affect the interests (and 
thus the sovereignty) of other states, the national legal order also has to take into account 
potential international issues that arise as a result.48 Accordingly, the state’s criminal ju-
risdiction is not founded upon international law, but international law does confine the 
state’s criminal jurisdiction.49 In other words, the normative boundaries for the state’s 
penal authority are found in international law. Thus, the question of whether or not the 
state has penal authority not only has to be answered through the national legislation, but 
also at the international level.
States essentially constitute sovereign territorial entities and are as a consequence always 
entitled to claim criminal jurisdiction over their own territory. Today, it is largely agreed 
upon that states may not, however, extend their criminal jurisdiction to acts committed 
abroad merely at their own discretion and that this issue is, in some way, governed by 
international law.50 The fundamental basis is fairly easy to formulate: states may only 
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to the extent that this does not infringe upon the 
sovereignty of other states.51 Obviously, a general requirement to respect the sovereignty 
of other states does not in itself provide us with any useful legal guidelines.
43 On the definition of international criminal law, see e.g. Satzger, Internationales und Europäisches 
Strafrecht (Nomos 2013) pp. 28 ff.
44 See e.g. Hecker, Europäisches Strafrecht (Springer 2010) p. 25.
45 See Träskman, Straffrättsliga åtgärder med främmande inslag, I. En granskning av den finska 
straffrättens tillämpningsområde (Juridiska föreningen i Finland 1977) p. 27 and Jescheck  & 
Weigend 1996 op. cit. p. 165.
46 Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 27.
47 Eser, in Schönke/Schröder: Strafgesetzbuch – Kommentar (Verlag C.H. Beck 2010) p. 67.
48 Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 20.
49 Spiermann, Moderne folkerett (Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 2006) p. 263.
50 See e.g. Council of Europe 1992 op. cit. p. 454.
51 Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 56.
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If we accept that states may not exercise jurisdiction merely at their own discretion, two 
distinct approaches can generally be distinguished.52 According to the first approach, 
states are permitted to extend their criminal jurisdiction extraterritorially as long as there 
is no prohibitive international rule to the contrary. In other words, that which is not 
prohibited is allowed.53 This permissive approach is generally derived from the classical 
‘Lotus case’, decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1927,54 where the 
court famously stated: 
‘It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising 
jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have 
taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international 
law. …[I]t leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited 
in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to 
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.’
According to the second and contrary approach, states are only permitted to extend their 
criminal jurisdiction extraterritorially if they are able to rely on a permissive rule of in-
ternational law. In other words, that which is not allowed is prohibited.55 According to 
this restrictive approach, such permissive rules are generally presumed to be manifested 
in the international principles of jurisdiction.56
Although the restrictive approach would seem to be more widely accepted today, both 
approaches have their evident problems. The protesting state either has to point to a pro-
hibitive rule, or the state claiming jurisdiction has to point to a permissive rule. In both 
cases, it can be rather cumbersome to demonstrate the existence and exact legal content 
of such rules. The question is whether it would not be possible to find a middle course 
that strives to take both approaches into account.57    
Regardless of which approach one advocates, it is clear that the limitations as well as the 
justifications for a state’s right to extraterritorial jurisdiction in some way have to be de-
rived from their sovereignty. As a starting point, the principle of the sovereign equality 
of states constitutes a principle that is essential for the existence of the nation-state in its 
historical form. This principle entails a demand for states to respect each other’s sover-
52 See e.g. Vander Beken et al. 2002 op. cit. p. 10, Reydams, Universal jurisdiction – international and 
municipal legal perspectives (Oxford University Press 2004) pp. 13–16 and Liivoja, An axiom of 
military law – Applicability of national criminal law to military personnel and associated civilians 
abroad (University of Helsinki, Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research 2011) p. 59. 
53 Werle & Jeßberger, in Leipziger Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch – Band 1 (De Gruyter Recht 
2007) pp. 402–403.
54 S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10.
55 Werle & Jeßberger 2007 op. cit. pp. 403.
56 See e.g. Liivoja 2011 op. cit. p. 78.
57 Cf. Eser 2010 op. cit. p. 68.
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eignty.58 Sovereignty in a substantive sense encompasses a state’s self-determination over 
its so-called internal affairs. The content of a state’s internal affairs can, in turn, be derived 
from the ‘Declaration on Friendly Relations’, adopted by the UN Security Council in 
1970.59 
According to this declaration, the sovereign equality of states (and their substantive sov-
ereignty derived thereof) entails inter alia that ‘Each State has the right freely to choose and 
develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems’. This implies that every state is 
entitled to freely decide upon its foreign and internal policy, and consequently also its 
criminal policy. 
While the demand for states to respect each other’s sovereignty in a positive sense entails 
a right for them to freely decide upon their internal affairs, there also follows a contrario 
a prohibition for states to intervene in each other’s internal affairs (the so called principle 
of non-intervention).60 In this sense, the right to extraterritorial regulation can, on the 
one hand, be regarded as a positive aspect of the state’s substantive sovereignty, while 
the principle of non-intervention can be regarded as its negative aspect.61 Consequently, 
sovereignty in a substantive sense gives a basis for, as well as a restriction of, the state’s 
criminal jurisdiction.62 
Accordingly, a state’s right to active self-determination as to its criminal policy is a part of 
the state’s internal affairs that is protected from foreign jurisdictional interference. Thus, 
if a state lays claim to penal authority with regard to acts committed on the territories of 
other states, this would prima facie appear to be an intervention in the internal affairs of 
those states.63 By extending the scope of application of its criminal law beyond its terri-
tory, the national legislator essentially exercises prohibitive authority on the territories 
58 Geiger, Grundgesetz und Völkerrecht (Verlag C.H. Beck 2002) p. 325. According to art. 2.1 of 
the Charter of the United Nations: ’The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members.’
59 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nation, Resolution no. 2625 (XXV), 
24 October 1970. See Ziegenhain 1992 op. cit. pp. 25–26.
60 See e.g. Ziegenhain 1992 op. cit. p. 27 and Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 193.
61 Ziegenhain 1992 op. cit. p. 27.
62 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 193.
63 Tupamäki 1999 op. cit. p. 141.
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of foreign states and thereby intervenes in those states’ sovereign right to regulate their 
internal affairs.64
However, it is clear that every foreign intervention in a state’s right to self-determina-
tion cannot be regarded as a violation of the principle of non-intervention.65 Namely, the 
state’s right to extraterritorial jurisdiction also follows from its sovereignty and right to 
self-determination.66
An exclusive right to territorial self-determination would e.g. prevent states from trying 
their own nationals for offences committed abroad or protecting themselves from offenc-
es directed at the state from abroad.67 If all claims to penal authority over acts committed 
abroad would invariably be questionable, every state would be obligated to delimit its leg-
islation to its own territory.68 It is clear that the legitimate interests of states often overlap, 
e.g. as regards territory and nationals.
Nonetheless, a state’s extension of its penal authority outside its own territory clearly 
affects the sovereign interests of other states.69 Extraterritorial jurisdiction can, conse-
quently, never constitute an exclusively internal state question, as the authority of the 
state’s extraterritorial claim is dependent upon its compatibility with international law 
standards.70 However, if extraterritorial jurisdiction – within certain limits – is permis-
sible, the positive aspect of the state’s substantive sovereignty cannot be absolute and 
exclusive either; states consequently do not possess an exclusive jurisdiction over their 
internal affairs.71 
Rather, the decisive question must be whether or not the intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states can be regarded as justified or not. Accordingly, the question is not 
64 Ambos 2008 op. cit. p. 20. It might certainly be true that real controversies only tend to arise 
when courts actually attempt to enforce the state’s claim on penal authority on the judicial level. 
Nevertheless, the need for justification with regard to international law already arises on the 
legislative level, i.e. when the state lays claim to penal authority. As Oxman 1987 op. cit. p. 278 
states: “The mere enactment of a statute or delivery of a summons may give rise to international 
protest because enforcement is implicitly threatened”. Of the same opinion also Jeβberger 2011 
op. cit. p. 214 and Asp, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence of the EU (Skrifter utgivna av 
Juridiska fakulteten vid Stockholms universitet 2012) p. 41.   
65 Council of Europe 1992 op. cit. p. 459 and Ziegenhain 1992 op. cit. p. 35.
66 This is evident already from the Lotus case, where the Permanent Court of International Justice 
stated that a state’s ‘title to exercise jurisdiction rest in its sovereignty’. See also Henrich 1994 op. 
cit. p. 17.
67 Council of Europe 1992 op. cit. p. 460.
68 See Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 52.
69 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 192.
70 See Träskman 1977 op. cit. pp. 209–210 and Henrich 1994 op. cit.  p. 12.
71 Rosswog, Das Problem der Vereinbarkeit des aktiven und passiven Personalgrundsatzes mit dem 
Völkerrecht (Ludwig Röhrscheid Verlag 1965) p. 138.
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about an absolute prohibition against intervening in the internal affairs of other states, 
but rather a prohibition against unjustified intervention.72 
In the current situation, we are dealing with a collision between two principles, i.e. the 
principle of active self-determination and the principle of non-intervention. If we regard 
principles as requirements of optimisation, this implies that these two principles have 
to be optimised in relation to each other, meaning that the sovereign claim of each state 
respectively has to be realised to the widest extent possible.73 
Thus, the positive and negative aspect of the state’s substantive sovereignty mutually re-
stricts each other.74 The principle of sovereign equality of states neither entails a complete 
prohibition against nor a limitless authorisation of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Neither 
of these two components may be realised at the other’s expense, but have to be brought in 
harmony through optimisation.
Regardless of how one approaches the question of the state’s right to extraterritorial juris-
diction, a state must in any case be able to identify a sufficient interest between itself and 
the object of its assertion of jurisdiction.75 By extending its national penal authority be-
yond its own borders, the state exercises prohibitive authority within the territory of for-
eign states. Such an intervention in other states’ self-determination has to be justified by 
reference to a connection that expresses a sufficient interest between the extraterritorial 
circumstance and the state laying claim to extraterritorial penal authority. This demand is 
manifested in the so-called ‘doctrine of meaningful connection’ that requires a sufficient 
interest-relation between the state enacting extraterritorial legislation and the extraterri-
torial circumstance it applies to.76 By combining the principle of non-intervention with a 
requirement of meaningful connection, the former gains clearer contours and legal pre-
ciseness.77 If a state extends its penal authority abroad without being able to demonstrate 
a meaningful connection, it violates the principle of non-intervention and, accordingly, 
72 Council of Europe 1992 op. cit. p. 459.
73 Ziegenhain 1992 op. cit. pp. 39–40. On principles as requirements of optimisation in general, see 
Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Suhrkamp 1986) pp. 75 ff.
74 Ziegenhain 1992 op. cit. pp. 51.
75 Oxman 1987 op. cit. pp. 278.
76 Alternative expressions used include ‘real link’, ‘sufficient nexus’ and ‘genuine connection’. See e.g. 
Cameron, The Protective Principle of Criminal Jurisdiction in Nordic Criminal Law, in Criminal 
Law Theory in Transition, eds. Lahti and Nuotio (Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company 1992) 
p. 567, Liivoja 2011 op. cit. pp. 72–74 and Satzger, International and European Criminal Law 
(C.H.Beck, Hart & Nomos 2012) pp. 12–13. On the requirement of a genuine connection 
between state and nationals, see also International Court of Justice, Judgment of 6 April 1955 – 
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), pp. 23 ff.
77 Henrich 1994 op. cit. pp. 17–18.
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international law.78 Thus, if we attempt to find a general international prohibition in ac-
cordance with the Lotus case, this prohibition has to be the principle of non-intervention.
The principle of non-intervention thus entails an extensive restriction of the state’s right 
to extraterritorial jurisdiction, and is violated if no meaningful connection between the 
circumstances and the state in question is found (negative requirement). Vice versa: A 
state may extend its penal authority if a meaningful connection is at hand (positive re-
quirement).79 
If one accepts this understanding, the permissive and restrictive approach can essentially 
be seen to lead to the same result.80 Extraterritorial jurisdiction is then permissible when 
no international prohibition is at hand. In this regard, the principle of non-intervention 
constitutes a general prohibition that is violated when no meaningful connection can be 
demonstrated. This, vice versa, implies that states have to be able to justify their extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction by reference to a meaningful connection. 
Consequently, if a meaningful connection is at hand, the principle of non-intervention 
has to yield to another state’s sovereignty based claim on jurisdiction. In want of such a 
connection, the principle of non-intervention outweighs the interests of the state claim-
ing jurisdiction. In my view, it is the task of the state claiming jurisdiction to demonstrate 
the existence of a meaningful connection, rather than the task of the state protesting 
against the jurisdictional claim to disprove that such a connection exists.81
The doctrine of meaningful connection can, accordingly, be regarded as a legal concre-
tisation of the limits of the principle of non-intervention. The existence of a meaningful 
connection implies that the state claiming extraterritorial jurisdiction is not unjustifiably 
intervening in the internal affairs of another state.
One of the problems with the doctrine of meaningful connection, however, is establish-
ing which connections can in fact be regarded as sufficiently ‘meaningful’. The meaning-
fulness of an invoked connection has to display a minimum of international consensus by 
reference to general sources of international law, such as international customary law and 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.82 In general, it is presupposed 
78 See e.g. Henrich 1994 op. cit. p. 18, Ambos 2008 op. cit. p. 21 and Satzger 2013 op. cit. p. 36.
79 Ziegenhain 1992 op. cit. p. 47 and Werle – Jeßberger 2007 op. cit. p. 402.
80 Cf. Werle – Jeßberger 2007 op. cit. p. 403.
81 See Bianchi, Comment to Harold G. Maier (Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law), 
in Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice, ed. Meessen (Kluwer Law International 
1996) p.  90. Of a different opinion, Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. pp. 213–214.
82 See Bianchi 1996 op. cit. p. 90. Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice contains 
what is generally viewed as the primary sources of international law, see Currie 2010 op. cit. pp. 
29–30.
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that the ‘principles’ of jurisdiction refer to such connections that display a minimum of 
international consensus.83 
3.3 Principles of jurisdiction
Any examination of jurisdictional questions would seem inadequate without some 
reference to the ‘principles’ of jurisdiction. When discussing these principles, one com-
monly refers to the principles formulated in the ‘Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdic-
tion with Respect to Crime’ of 1935:84 the territorial principle, the nationality principle 
(or active personality principle), the protective principle, the universality principle and 
the passive personality principle.85 Other principles often referred to are the flag princi-
ple and the principle of representational jurisdiction.86 What all these principles have in 
common, is that they are presupposed to indicate some form of connection, based on 
which a state is authorised to establish its jurisdiction.
However, the normative significance of these principles is disputed. On the one hand, 
it is clear that international law does not provide any clear-cut jurisdictional rules.87 On 
the other hand, if one accepts that states do not have an unrestricted right to extend their 
criminal jurisdiction, these principles cannot completely lack normative power, i.e. the 
presumption is that these principles in some way govern the state’s exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction. In order to make it possible to examine these principles, one must, as a start-
ing basis, make a distinction between national principles of jurisdiction and international 
principles of jurisdiction.88 
On the national level, jurisdictional norms in general take the form of rules that prescribe 
under which conditions national criminal law applies, and thereby establish the state’s 
claim on penal authority. Each of these rules prescribes a connection or condition under 
which the national criminal law applies (e.g. the nationality of the offender or victim 
or the nature of the offence). This makes it possible to categorise the rules according to 
different labels, commonly referred to as principles. For instance, a rule stating that na-
tional criminal law applies to offences committed outside the state by its nationals can 
be categorised under a national principle of active personality. Accordingly, the national 
principles indicate to which extent, and based on which grounds, national criminal law is 
applicable, and are thus always bound to a specific national legal order. 
83 See e.g. Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 205.
84 Harvard Research in International Law: Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 
Supplement to the American Journal of International Law (1935) pp. 437–635.
85 See ibid. p. 445.
86 See further e.g. Currie 2010 op. cit. pp. 56 ff. and Satzger 2013 op. cit. pp. 36 ff.
87 Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 79.
88 See Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 32.
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These national principles are the results of attempts to identify and systematise overall 
elements in the national rules of jurisdiction. They therefore have a descriptive function. 
They are used to describe, compare and analyse the jurisdictional rules of states.89 They 
thus provide an analytical framework that makes it possible to examine and classify na-
tional jurisdictional norms and thereby provide information on the extent to which the 
national penal order lays claim to penal authority. This makes it possible to submit that a 
national jurisdictional rule expresses or regulates a certain principle.90 
The international principles, on the other hand, demarcate the area in which internation-
al law allows the establishment of penal authority.91 They indicate when a minimum of 
international consensus can be seen to exist as to the acceptance of certain connections.92 
The international principles are thus often referred to as ‘legitimate’ connections that 
give a concrete delimitation to the expression ‘meaningful connection’ and constituently 
establish which connections the national legislator may refer to when determining the 
state’s penal authority.93 They therefore also have a normative function. 
However, this theoretically advisable distinction between national and international 
principles of jurisdiction is complicated in practice due to the interaction that exits be-
tween these elements. This interaction becomes clear when one considers the process 
behind the international principles as a part of international law.94 Namely, the interna-
tional principles must be seen to have developed from the national principles as they, in 
turn, have been enshrined in national legislation. This process has its roots in the general 
sources of international law, such as international customary law and general principles 
of law.95 There is thus a continuous process of interaction between the national and inter-
national dimensions of these principles.96
In the course of their development, the international principles have become detached 
from the national principles and have acquired an independent meaning as international 
norms of permissibility.97 Thus, they indicate the extent to which states are normatively 
permitted to establish a national claim to penal authority. They are based on, and form 
typical examples of, balancing a state’s active self-determination against the principle of 
89 See Cameron 1992 op. cit. p. 566 and Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 35.
90 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. pp. 34–35.
91 Eser 2010 op. cit. p. 71.
92 Cf. Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 213. 
93 See Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 58 and 80 and Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. pp. 33–34.
94 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 36.
95 See Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 58.
96 The relationship is, as Currie 2010 op. cit. p. 50 puts it, ’symbiotic’.
97 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 36.
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non-intervention. As such, they facilitate the need of national legislators and judiciaries 
to conduct a new exercise in balancing these two interests in every single case.98 
Accordingly, a state’s exercise of jurisdiction may very well be in accordance with its 
national law on jurisdiction but nevertheless be contrary to international jurisdictional 
standards.99 National rules on jurisdiction are not sufficient per se to establish meaningful 
connections, since they are not necessarily prescribed in consideration of the principle 
of non-intervention, but rather follow national criminal policy considerations and inter-
ests.100 However, as long as a national rule can be subsumed under an accepted interna-
tional principle of jurisdiction, there is a strong presumption that the rule gives expres-
sion for a connection that is meaningful.101 
The question still remains of whether the international principles of jurisdiction should 
be regarded as exhaustive norms of permission, or whether states may also extend their 
penal authority beyond the existing principles or refer to new principles, as long as they 
are able to demonstrate the existence of a meaningful connection. Some scholars con-
tend that states must always be able to refer to one of the accepted principles in order to 
justify their jurisdictional claim,102 while others propose that states may very well refer 
to connections outside of these principles, as long as they are able to demonstrate their 
meaningfulness103.  
In my view, states should in principle be able to invoke connections that fall outside the 
accepted principles of jurisdiction, as long as they are able to demonstrate a sufficient in-
ternational basis for them, i.e. a meaningful connection. In theory, national jurisdictional 
rules might very well give rise to new internationally accepted principles of jurisdiction. 
International law is not, after all, a static legal area, but develops concurrently with in-
ternational agreements, state practice and general principles of law. In this case, I would, 
however, contend that it is up to the state extending its penal authority beyond the ac-
cepted principles to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient international consensus as 
to the connection it bases its jurisdiction upon.
98 Reydams 2004 op. cit. pp. 23–24.
99 Currie 2010 op. cit. pp. 51.
100 Ambos 2008 op. cit. p. 24 and Hecker 2010 op. cit. p. 30.
101 I will not discuss further which individual principles can actually be considered accepted under 
international or European law. On this issue, see e.g. Ambos 2008 op. cit. pp. 23 ff. and Böse, 
Meyer & Schneider 2014 op. cit. pp. 43 ff.
102 See e.g. Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. pp. 212–213.
103 See e.g. Ziegenhain 1992 op. cit. p. 7 and Henrich 1994 op. cit. p. 21. Cf. also Böse & 
Meyer, Die Beschränkung nationaler Strafgewalten als Möglichkeit zur Vermeidung 
von Jurisdiktionskonflikten in der Europäischen Union, 5 Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik (2011) pp. 336–344, at 338.
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On the other hand, one should not underestimate the safety that the established prin-
ciples offer the national legislator.104 By basing the national law on jurisdiction on the 
accepted principles of jurisdiction – and keeping within their limits – the national legis-
lator ensures a strong presumption of the national rules’ compatibility with international 
standards.105 
4.  The ‘how’ of criminal jurisdiction – How should the state exer-
cise its penal authority?
The fact that a state establishes its penal authority over certain behaviour only implies 
prima facie that the state lays claim to criminal appraisal of this behaviour, i.e. a claim on 
the right to penalise and punish. The question of ‘how’ – as opposed to ‘if ’ – this appraisal 
should be conducted is principally not answered until a specific criminal law is declared 
applicable. Accordingly, the question of the national penal order’s scope of appraisal is 
distinct from the question of the scope of application of the national criminal law. By es-
tablishing the scope of application of the state’s criminal law, the national legislator indi-
cates the area that is to be appraised by way of the criminal law in question. The national 
criminal legislation and the provisions that are part of it are declared as standards for the 
appraisal of specific circumstances.106
One often finds that the national provisions on criminal jurisdiction are equated with 
the provisions on the scope of application of national criminal law. Jurisdiction in this 
sense concerns the state’s criminal appraisal of unwanted behaviour, which is manifested 
through the national criminal law. This also explains why the law on criminal jurisdic-
tion in German legal doctrine is often referred to as Strafrechtsanwendungsrecht, which 
can roughly be translated as ‘law on the use of criminal law.’ 107 As no comparable term 
seems to exist in English, it appears that the best way to indicate the legal area covering 
a state’s provisions on criminal jurisdiction is simply to refer to it as the ‘law on criminal 
jurisdiction.’108        
The fact that the scope of application of the state’s criminal law as a clear principal rule 
coincides with the national claim on penal authority should, however, not be seen as 
104 Henrich 1994 op. cit. p. 23.
105 See also O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction – Clarifying the Basic Concept, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2004) pp. 735–760, at 738 footnote 12.
106 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. pp. 12–14. 
107 See e.g. Satzger 2013 op. cit. p. 31.
108 For the Swedish doctrine, see also e.g. Asp, Internationell straffrätt (Iustus Förlag 2011) p. 26, 
who uses the term ’jurisdiktionsrätt’. 
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self-evident. In theory, a state’s claim on penal authority can also be realised through the 
use of other than national criminal law (e.g. foreign or supranational criminal law).109 
The national provisions on criminal jurisdiction would thus not only concern the matter 
of the scope of application of the state’s criminal law, but also the – chiefly independent – 
question of the national claim on penal authority.110 In this sense, the national provisions 
on criminal jurisdiction answer two distinct questions: ‘does the state have penal author-
ity?’ (‘if ’) and ‘according to which norms shall this authority be exercised?’ (‘how’)111
Accordingly, a state’s claim on criminal appraisal of certain circumstances is established 
directly through the declaration of a certain criminal law as applicable, regardless of 
which criminal law.112 Hence, the state’s prescriptive jurisdiction does not only concern 
the demarcation of the scope of application of national criminal law, but also the demar-
cation of national penal authority.113 In theory, this implies that national penal authority 
can be wider than the scope of application of national criminal law.114
However, this distinction between national penal authority and scope of application of 
national criminal law can largely be disregarded, since it is of importance only if national 
courts are able to apply other legislation than national criminal law.115 As long as this is 
not the case, the state’s claim on penal authority can, consequently, not be more extensive 
than scope of application of national criminal law. Thus, the question of national penal 
authority and the scope of application of national criminal law are determined by the 
same norms. The fact that national criminal law is declared applicable to extraterritorial 
behaviour under certain conditions simultaneously entails that national penal authority 
is established under the corresponding conditions.116  
Admittedly, states are often obliged to take foreign criminal law in consideration when 
assessing a potential jurisdictional requirement of double criminality. However, even 
though the state’s penal authority is made conditional upon the requirement of double 
109 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 15.
110 This twofold character of the national provisions on criminal jurisdiction is widely accepted at 
least in German criminal law doctrine, see e.g. Jescheck – Weigend 1996 op. cit. pp. 163–164.
111 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 14. This distinction between penal authority and scope of application 
of the national criminal law is also found Finnish criminal law doctrine, see Serlachius, Suomen 
rikosoikeuden oppikirja. Ensimmäinen osa. Yleiset opit (Helsinki 1940) pp. 66–67.
112 Neumann, Normtheoretische Aspekte der Irrtumsproblematik im Bereich des ”Internationalen 
Strafrechts”, in Grundfragen staatlichen Strafens – Festschrift für Heinz Müller-Dietz zum 70. 
Geburtstag, eds. Britz et al. (Verlag C.H. Beck 2001) p. 600 and Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 14.
113 Eser 2010 op. cit. p. 66.
114 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 15.
115 Henrich 1994 op. cit. p. 9 footnote 2 and Ambos 2008 op. cit. p. 3.
116 See e.g. Satzger 2013 op. cit. p. 32.
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criminality in some situations; this does not amount to actually applying foreign criminal 
law, but rather implies a potential bar to the application of national law.117
Nevertheless, the fact that states as a clear general rule only implement their penal au-
thority by way of national criminal law does not necessary signify that this distinction 
between penal authority and applicable criminal law is merely theoretical. That a legal 
order claims a right to punish through the application of other legislation than national 
law is not an impossibility and has also occurred in practice.118 In this case, the state does 
lay claim to penal authority of its own, but the criminal appraisal is done through the 
application of other legal sources than national criminal law.119 This was e.g. the case until 
2006 according to article 5 of the Swiss criminal code:120
‘Whoever commits a felony or misdemeanour against a Swiss national abroad is to be 
punished according to Swiss law, provided the act is also criminal under the law of the 
territory where it was committed, if he is present in Switzerland and will not be extra-
dited or if he is extradited to the Confederation because of this act. If the law of the place 
of the commission is more favourable to the offender, it is to be applied.’
In this case, the law on criminal jurisdiction could – similarly to international private law 
– be regarded as a form of collision law, enabling a choice between different legal orders 
in cases of overlap.121 But as long as this is not the case, criminal jurisdiction does not only 
constitute a question of procedural forum. To distinguish the question of forum from the 
question of choice of law – as is common in international private law – would therefore 
be misleading. In criminal law, the forum does not determine which law to apply, but the 
applicable law rather determines the forum.122 If national criminal law is not applicable 
– i.e. if the state lacks a claim to penal authority – the state also lacks judicial authority. 
The law on criminal jurisdiction does not regulate what can be understood as conflicts 
between different national legal orders, only the extent to which the national legal order 
is applicable.123 
However, in an increasingly integrated Europe, one could question whether it in the long 
run would be conceivable to create a system where the applicable criminal law – at least 
as regards certain offences – would not be dependent upon the trial state. The Swiss and 
117 See van den Wyngaert, Double Criminality as a Requirement to Jurisdiction, in Double 
criminality – Studies in international criminal law, ed. Jareborg (Iustus Förlag 1989), p. 44.
118 Neumann 2001 op. cit. p. 599.
119 Jeβberger 2011 op. cit. p. 15.
120 See Satzger 2012 op. cit. p. 8. A similar provision was earlier also found in the German criminal 
code, see Jescheck & Weigend 1996 op. cit. p. 164.
121 Satzger 2012 op. cit. p. 8.
122 See Lombois, Droit pénal international (Dalloz 1979) pp. 8–9.
123 Satzger 2012 op. cit. pp. 8–9.
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German examples above demonstrate that this would not be a completely new concept. 
The general development within the EU undoubtedly raises the question of when the EU 
can be regarded as having federal characteristics to the extent that the member states are 
able to apply some form of legal framework on the choice of law. Consequently, national 
courts would be able to apply other than domestic law not only in civil cases, but also in 
criminal cases. Such a system can undeniably be seen to have some benefits.124
This would namely enable the application of the substantive penal order that has the 
closest connection to the case, irrespective of forum.125 This could first of all remove the 
current reason for unequal treatment with regards to criminal sentencing, which can e.g. 
bring about the situation that two persons who commit an offence together, but there-
after flee to different member states, can receive entirely different punishments. Second 
of all, it could contribute to removing some of the misgivings that exist especially with 
regards to the European arrest warrant. The state with the most repressive penal order or 
the state that first renders a final decision in accordance with the ‘first come first served’ 
principle would no longer get the upper hand. Instead, the penal order with the closest 
connection to the case – mainly the place of commission – would apply, which can either 
be more lenient or more severe than other states’ systems.126 
Furthermore, the question of the EU’s competence to prescribe supranational criminal 
provisions arises. Directly applicable regulations that include criminal provisions could 
namely imply that national courts would be obliged to apply other than national (i.e. na-
tionally implemented) criminal law.127 In this case, member states would establish their 
penal authority by reference to a supranational legal order.
5.  The ‘when’ of criminal jurisdiction – When should the state en-
force its penal authority?
The distinction between a state’s penal authority and judicial authority is especially 
important when considering the ‘when’ of criminal jurisdiction. The question of whether 
or not the states has penal authority (‘if ’) and which law to apply (‘how’) mainly con-
124 See Greve, Danske straffebestemmelsers interlegale gyldighed: Træk af en forvirret retsudvikling, 
in Liber amicarum et amicorum Karin Cornils – Glimt af nordisk straffrätt og straffeprosessrett, 
eds. Elholm et al. (Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 2010) pp. 179–180 and Satzger 2012 op. 
cit. p. 9.
125 Jescheck & Weigend 1996 op. cit. p. 164 and Satzger 2012 op. cit. p. 9.
126 See Greve 2010 op. cit. p. 180. On the other hand, the legal and practical problems with such a 
system should obviously not be underestimated, see e.g. Ambos 2008 op. cit. p. 69.
127 On the current legal possibilities for enacting supranational EU criminal law, see e.g. Satzger 
2012 op. cit. pp. 48 ff. and Asp 2012 op. cit. pp. 141 ff. 
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cern the legislative level. In this context, we can also speak of the state having ‘abstract’ 
jurisdiction, meaning that the state has a normative claim on penal authority, without 
anything being said about the concrete enforcement of this claim.
As already noted, state interests often overlap and states are in principle entitled to ex-
tend their penal authority also to extraterritorial circumstances, as long as they are able 
to demonstrate a meaningful connection. Consequently, international law accepts that 
the criminal jurisdiction (i.e. the penal authority) of states may overlap. Even though 
one could discuss whether or not some of the principles of jurisdiction are stronger than 
other ones – implying that ‘weaker’ claims should yield to ‘stronger’ ones – international 
law does not seem to provide a clear solution to this problem.128  
First of all, states’ unilateral regulation of their jurisdiction inevitably brings about situ-
ations where several states’ claims on penal authority can cover the same act. Secondly, 
international conventions and EU legislation also result in ‘jurisdictional networks’ that 
give states overlapping penal authority. 
However, it would obviously be unreasonable if states felt compelled to exercise judicial 
authority over all extraterritorial acts that are e.g. committed by their nationals, even 
though these acts fall within the scope of application of their criminal law. Abstract ap-
plicability of a state’s criminal law (i.e. existence of penal authority) does not categorically 
imply concrete application (i.e. exercise of judicial authority). Thus, by laying claim to 
penal authority through the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, the state determines the 
outer legal limits of its judicial jurisdiction, but does not necessarily say anything about 
whether judicial authority should be exercised in concreto.   
Thus the question arises: When should a state actually enforce its penal authority? This 
rather concerns the judicial level, i.e. the concrete exercise of judicial authority. If more 
than one state simultaneously decides to exercise judicial authority over the same act, we 
can be said to be dealing with a ‘concrete’ conflict of jurisdiction. In the words of the ex-
planatory report to the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal 
Matters:129 
‘A conflict of competence in concreto arises or exists, when the authorities of two or more 
States, competent under domestic law, simultaneously claim jurisdiction in the same 
case and actually start proceedings or, at least, indicate their intention to do so. It is not 
necessary that the competence of one of the States concerned should actually be contest-
ed; it is sufficient that two or more States are acting simultaneously and that there is a 
consequent overlapping of proceedings.’
128 See e.g. Henrich 1994 op. cit. pp. 77–78.
129 Explanatory report (Part IV, General remarks) to the European Convention on the Transfer of 
Proceedings in Criminal Matters (CETS No. 73). See also Vander Beken et al. 2002 op. cit. p. 18.
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Such conflicts of jurisdiction can have negative consequences for the efficiency of a state’s 
criminal proceedings as well as for individuals that are thereby affected. Also, due to the 
fact that we have a functional transnational ne bis in idem rule – at least within the EU 
– only one state will be able to effectively enforce its penal authority: the state that first 
renders a final decision will prevent all other states from enforcing their penal authority 
in accordance with the principle of ’first come first served’, even though it would perhaps 
have been more appropriate to handle the case in another state.130 
As regards the national judiciary, the rules on jurisdiction prescribed by the state legisla-
tor can be regarded as a form of outer limits. Naturally, the judiciary cannot claim juris-
diction outside the limits of the state’s penal authority, but can also be obligated to take 
further jurisdictional requirements into account in individual cases. One has to keep in 
mind that judicial jurisdiction is always exercised in individual cases, while the legislative 
power has as its task to prescribe general norms. The fact that a norm is applicable does 
not imply that it has to be applied.
In order to redress the overlapping penal authority of states, it can be up to the judicial 
authorities to decide to which extent the state should actually exercise its judicial author-
ity.131 The judicial authorities may under certain circumstances – e.g. due to consider-
ations of appropriateness, sovereignty or foreseeability – very well decide not to institute 
legal proceedings, although the offence as such is covered by the state’s penal authority.132 
Among all the offences that in principle fall under a state’s penal authority, legal proceed-
ings should only be initiated against those offences that affect the interests of the state in 
such a way that it is justifiable to initiate proceedings. The aim should always be to allo-
cate the legal proceedings to the state that is best qualified to provide a fair trial. In order 
to carry out this selection, a requirement for initiating proceedings against – foremost 
extraterritorial – offences is often that a higher prosecutorial authority or higher state 
authority (e.g. the head of state) issues a prosecution order for the offence in question.133 
For instance, according to chapter 1, section 12 of the Finnish Penal Code, a criminal case 
may generally not be investigated in Finland without a prosecution order by the Prosecu-
tor-General, if the offence is committed abroad.134 This consideration on the judicial level 
does not affect the state’s penal authority as such, but rather functions as a safety valve 
130 See e.g. Klip, European Criminal Law – An Integrative Approach (Intersentia 2012) pp. 199–200.
131 See e.g. Swart, Jurisdiction in Criminal Law: Some Reflections on the Finnish Code from a 
Comparative Perspective, in Criminal Law Theory in Transition, eds. Lahti and Nuotio (Finnish 
Lawyers’ Publishing Company 1992) p. 533.
132 See e.g Vander Beeken et al. 2002 op. cit. p. 18.
133 Träskman 1977 op. cit. p. 342.
134 Similar provisions are found e.g. in Chapter 2, section 5 of the Swedish Penal Code and section 
153c of the German Code on Criminal Procedure.
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that makes it possible to assess whether or not concrete judicial authority should be ex-
ercised in individual cases. The possibility to balance the interests of involved states and 
individuals should naturally be ensured through legislation, but the actual assessment 
can only be conducted at the judicial level. The legislator cannot be expected to foresee 
every type of potential conflict of interests or rights beforehand.135 
The possibility to refrain from prosecution means that the state’s potentially extensive 
claim on penal authority in individual cases can be corrected by procedural means.136 
The underlying aim is to take account of international principles of state sovereignty and 
potential conflicts of jurisdiction as well as the interests of individuals involved before 
proceedings are initiated. However, clear rules on which criteria to take account of when 
considering whether or not to initiate proceedings seldom exist in national law – deci-
sions are made on a case-by-case basis.137
The problem has been discussed intensively especially with regards to EU member states, 
which are presupposed to practice a close legal cooperation based on mutual trust. At 
the European level, some cautious steps have undeniably been taken in order to remedy 
the problem of conflicts of jurisdiction. The Council Framework decision on prevention 
and settlement of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, adopted 
in 2009, only requires the member states to set up consultation proceedings with each 
other ‘with the aim of achieving a consensus on any effective solution aimed at avoiding 
the adverse consequences arising from parallel proceedings,’ without actually obligating 
member states to reach a consensus. Neither does it provide any binding guidelines on 
how to choose the ‘most appropriate’ place for prosecution. Even though I do not share 
all the criticism directed at the framework decision,138 it is without doubt only a first 
and inadequate step towards solving the problem. Several noteworthy models for dealing 
135 See Spiermann, Personalhøjhed, in Festskrift til Jørn Vestergaard, eds. Baumbach, Dam & 
Toftegaard Nielsen (Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 2008) p. 457–458.
136 Werle & Jeßberger 2007 op. cit. p. 464.
137 Cf. also Summary of the answers given in reply to the questionnaire on the situation where 
several Member States have jurisdiction to conduct criminal proceedings for the same facts of an 
alleged criminal offence, Council doc. 17553/08, COPEN 263, 5.1.2009, p. 6: ‘Various Member 
States underlined that the cases/situations are dealt with on a case-by-case basis, depending on 
the results of the (direct) contacts between the competent authorities of the States concerned.’
138 Cf. e.g. Gebbie, Conflict of European Jurisdiction – A Matter of Concurrence, New Journal of 
European Criminal Law – Special Edition (2009), pp. 11–15, who argues that the framework 
decision undermines the rights of individuals affected by transnational proceedings. Personally, 
I believe that consultation proceedings regulated to a certain extent are better than completely 
unregulated ad hoc proceedings or a complete lack thereof. The problem of balancing the 
member states’ interest in effective prosecution and the interests of individuals is a rather more 
comprehensive problem, characteristic for the whole area of cooperation in criminal matters 
within the EU, which cannot be remedied through one single instrument.  
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with conflicts of criminal jurisdiction have already been proposed by legal scholars.139 
Regardless of which way forward the EU chooses, an appropriate model to solve such 
conflicts requires above all a sufficient level of transparency and predictability.   
6.  Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to analytically ‘dissect’ the concept of criminal juris-
diction. I have argued that criminal jurisdiction first and foremost entails a claim on the 
right to punish by the state, which can be expressed as a claim on penal authority. When 
a state claims penal authority, it claims a right to penalize and punish certain behaviour in 
relation to individuals, but also in relation to other states. Since a state’s claim on criminal 
jurisdiction brings the sovereign interests of other states to the fore, this claim must be 
in accordance with standards of international law. International law entitles the state to 
penal authority, provided that it is able to demonstrate a so-called ‘meaningful connec-
tion’ between itself and the behaviour it seeks to regulate. When the state lays claim to 
criminal jurisdiction, it consequently makes use of the penal authority it is entitled to. As 
a general rule, the state establishes its penal authority through the scope of application 
of its national criminal law. However, it is also conceivable that a state lays claim to pe-
nal authority through the use of other than national criminal law. In this case, the state 
would exercise its penal authority by reference to e.g. foreign or supranational criminal 
law. The fact that a certain act falls within the penal authority of a state does not, how-
ever, categorically imply that the state must or should enforce its penal authority. Since 
the penal authority of states frequently overlap, it would be unfeasible if all states having 
criminal jurisdiction over the same act would feel compelled to enforce their penal au-
thority. In such cases of ‘conflict of jurisdiction’, the question of whether or not a state 
actually should attempt to enforce its penal authority in practice always requires further 
deliberation and balancing of interests
139 See e.g. Sinn et al., Draft models of a regulatory mechanism for the avoidance of jurisdictional 
conflicts, in Jurisdiktionskonflikte bei grenzüberschreitender Kriminalität – Ein Rechtsvergleich 
zum Internationalen Strafrecht, ed. Sinn (V&R unipress 2012) pp. 597 ff., Böse, Meyer & 
Schneider 2014 op. cit. pp. 333 ff. and Zimmermann, Strafgewaltkonflikte in der Europäischen 
Union (Nomos 2014) pp. 320 ff. See also the contribution by Frank Zimmermann in this issue.
